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Monday, May 21, 2007

� Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas

� Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas

Thursday, May 17, 2007

Tathagata Sathpathy - Editor Dharitri on What Orissa MPs can do?

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What Orissa MPs can do? They can do better by asking for royalty of Iron
Ore to be linked 80% of world market price and no SEZ.



It is really commendable that MPs from Orissa have stood up at long last in the parliament on the IIT issue and made voice of Orissa, heard. As we know the protest has not yielded any result, at least immediately. Govt. of India, has gotten accustomed to an acquiescing Orissa, with little or no protest on such issues, even as much as a squeak. My suggestion to our MPs would be: don't waste your energy in begging. I was checking yesterday and found that 46.7 million tons of Iron Ore have been raised last year from the mines of Orissa. If we could charge the world market price to the buyers, Government of Orissa(GOO), would have earned: ($84.4-$10)*46.5 million =$3.5 billion $$. Where $10 (Rs. 450) is the raising cost. If we get this money then GOO can have: Fifteen, Rs. 1000 crore IITs. And if Orissa MPs can collaborate with MPs of Jharkhand and 36 garh, we will be in a position like OPEC countries to pay our way to a developed condition. Now some one may ask me, how do we get this done? This is money that the mine licensee are minting(and integrated steel plant owners) – how does Government of Orissa / 36 Garh / Jharkhand can earn it? My answer is through – Orissa Mining Corporation. Even if the cost to OMC is $15 due it's inefficient & higher cost ways (no corrupt practices will of course be allowed), the money thus earned can be given back or donated to GOO prescribed causes and spent on the mined/mining areas for their development. There will be enough, Rs.15000 crore of earning for every cause in Orissa, every year, at the present rate. If GOO gets $60 as royalty - there still will be $25 for mining and transportation etc. It is OK to have the pit head steel plant but that they can be given the license so the state gets it's $60 or 80% of world market price which ever is greater. Posco/ Mittal or TATAs will still have 5% advantage over others to locate the steel plant in Orissa or 36 Garh or Jharkhand, considering there is a 10 to 15% disadvantage of backward area due unavailability of ready made infrastructure. Let our MPs do us a favor, demand to GOI to raise and link the Royalty to 80% of the world Ore price permanently. And let GOO ensure that there is no stealing of Ore from the mines as is prevalent. And Orissa will then have money for everything and to spare. We need to spend the money to make our 7,011 high schools were functioning in the State (now 7800) Oriya medium High schools, 44,416 Primary Schools, 14.233 Upper Primary Schools, comparable to the English medium schools or better like it was in 50s and 60s, when a Purusottampur High School, produced a topper in High School Certificate examination. ( An educated citizenry can take care of themselves.

Best wishes,
Sandip Dasverma

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Dear Mr Dasverma

I am so happy that atleast one person is logical. While most of our energy is wasted dancing to the tune of email senders and asking for an IIT, our basic education level has dropped beyond recognition. In most rural schools of Orissa, we barely have oneteacher for nearly 4 or 5 classes. Each containing not less then 40 students. Most primary schools have no class rooms. We have to resort to desperate exerciseslike Mid Day meal schemes to entice the children to keep coming to school. Our drop out level is not only the highest in India, it is higher than most Africannations. Mid Day meals, as you know well, keeps that single teacher busy throughout the entire working dayprocuring food stuff, cooking and serving the kids. If she/he is found failing in that, then out they go from the job. Are you also aware that most Sikshay Karmisdid not join their assigned posts? First, they did not ind the pay packets attractive. Second, they wantedto be posted in their own village, not even the same Block suffised. And most interestingly, they went on a strike last year without commencing work for even a day. When you say--"An educated citizenry can take care of themselves", I assume you did not imply a techie from some IIT but general people who are educated enough to understand which way the nation goes.And I fully agree with you. I, as an editor and also as an MP, have been demanding publicly that mining in Orissa (iron ore, coal, chrome and all)should be handed over to professional mining companies who would bring in latest world class technologies and ensure no theft or pilferage takes place. The ores thus lifted should be graded and stacked in government alloted stockyards. OMC will operate escrow accounts with these private companies. Genuine end users (first preference for industries within Orissa,not by compromising price but when stocks are limited only) will bid and buy the ores at international prices by paying OMC. Since the account will be of a particular nature, the mining company can not be harrassed by the bureaucrats in getting itspayments. This payment will include cost of raising and also the profit margin.OMC would give the Central governement its dues and keep the State's cut as its profit. The highest bidder is then directed to lift its required ore from a designated yard. Quantity of ore available in each yard would be daily updated on the net by the mining company.This would ensure no mischief by OMC and also immediate delivery to the bid winner. This way Orissa avoids the huge loss of precious minerals being incurred due to loss in mining thru archaic technology.Theft will dwindle since private motivated guards will replace inept mining department officials. Daily output from each mine, amount transported, stock level, bid amounts accepted and stocks lifted etc could all be on the net and transparent to the public. Then OMC could single handedly finance all development projects in Orissa. The best example of this kind of an exercise could be seen in the steps taken by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. But then.....who has the time to think of Orissa. We are all soooo busy with our fanciful thoughts.


Tathagata Satpathy
Editor

Sunday, May 13, 2007

SC allows field trials of GM crops


Posted online: Wednesday, May 09, 2007 at 0000 hours IST
Send Feedback E-mail this story Print this story
NEW DELHI, MAY 8: The Supreme Court on Tuesday permitted field trials of genetically modified (GM) crops approved by the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) in 2006, but with riders.

A special bench consisting of Chief Justice KG Balakrishnan, Justice DK Jain and Justice Tarun Chatterjee said the GM crop fields should be at least 200 metres away from fields with normal crops. One lead scientist should be made responsible for the trials. The scientist, the bench said, should ensure that non-GM crop fields were not contaminated by pollen flow from GM crops.






The GEAC should lay down a protocol for ensuring 0.01% contamination by GM crops, it added.

The court was hearing a writ petition filed by Aruna Rodrigues, PV Satheesh and others, calling for a moratorium on GM crops. Their advocate Prashant Bhushan pleaded against allowing field trials owing to health and environmental hazards.

The government had filed an application, urging either vacation of the ban order or its modification.

The Riders

GM crop fields should be at least 200 metres away from normal crops fields
A scientist should ensure non-GM crop fields weren’t contaminated by GM crops

The apex court order came as a relief to the biotech industry, which had sought lifting of the ban on fresh approvals for GM crop field trials imposed by the court on September 22, 2006.

In another reprieve to the industry, the court allowed commercial cultivation of Bt cotton based on four approved events – Cry 1 Ac MON 531 sourced from Monsanto, Cry 1 Ac + Cry 2 Ab MON 15985 sourced from Monsanto, Event I sourced from IIT Kharaghpur and GFM event sourced from China.

Thursday, May 10, 2007

SEZs are turning into land scam: Rahul Bajaj

SEZs are turning into land scam: Rahul Bajaj
SEZs are turning into land scam: Rahul Bajaj

May 04, 2007 14:56 IST

In a zest to secure tax holidays, developers are gradually turning special economic zones into a land scam, a leading industrialist has said.

Today, big industrial houses acquiring land for SEZs are "almost turning it into a scam in the name of development," Bajaj Auto Chairman and Rajya Sabha member Rahul Bajaj said at a seminar organised by Consumer Unity and Trust Society in New Delhi on Thursday.

Advocating direct interaction with the farmers, he said, if vast stretches of land have to be acquired to set up SEZs the companies must get them by paying the right value, and not the subsidised rates.

He also said it would not be fair to compare the SEZs in India with that of China, as in case of the latter the land is owned by the state and the benefits go directly to the people. But, in this case it is the developer who is benefiting the most.

Bajaj said development of an industrial area does not mean it has to be near an existing city. It would be of more significance if the infrastructure creation takes place at a distance providing an opportunity to promote auxiliary settlement, he added.

Echoing his thought, independent Rajya Sabha member P C Alexender said, currently, SEZs are defying the initial social objective of providing small and medium entrepreneurs a growth opportunity.

Supporting the SEZ Policy of the government, Rajya Sabha member and Founder of Farmers' Union Shetkari Sangathan Sharad Joshi said farmers, who are unable to repay their debts, are willing to give up agriculture in return of a better life that an SEZ promises.

17 new SEZs get nod, RIL on hold

17 new SEZs get nod, RIL on hold

17 new SEZs get nod, RIL on hold

May 09, 2007 16:01 IST
Last Updated: May 09, 2007 20:17 IST

The Board of Approvals on Wednesday gave formal approval to 17 Special Economic Zones, including those of Vedanta and DLF, but deferred a decision on the Navi Mumbai zone promoted by Reliance Industries chief Mukesh Ambani and his associate Anand Jain.

The Board took up 23 cases, which had in-principle approval, for final clearance. Among others, it approved Vedanta Alumina and DLF's SEZs in Orissa, Suzlon's two zones in Gujarat and Karnataka and Unitech's IT SEZ in West Bengal.

However, the Navi Mumbai SEZ failed to get clearance as Revenue Department wanted more details on measures proposed by the promoters to plug revenue leakages, official sources said.

"A railway line and a road pass through the 1,250 hectare SEZ and Revenue Department wanted to confirm if the steps proposed by the company to prevent possible revenue loss through these transit routes were adequate," the sources said.

According to SEZ rules, in case a road or a railway line pass through a zone, the developer can build an underpass or an overbridge to secure clearance.

Revenue department officials could also visit the site of the SEZ and the proposal could be taken up at the next meeting of the board on May 31, they said.

In the next meeting, the Board will take up 40 fresh proposals for SEZs that already have land. "As they have land, they will be given formal approval straight away. There are as many as 369 SEZ proposals pending before the board of which 160 have land," the sources added.

Apart from Navi Mumbai, six other SEZs that came for formal approval were deferred because of land issues.

India's great rush for SEZs

Monday, May 07, 2007

Tata Steel for rehabilitation First - Kalinganagar and Tontoposhi

The Telegraph - Calcutta : Frontpage

Orissa trip for displaced
- Tata Steel for rehabilitation first

Jamshedpur, May 7: Tata Steel today unveiled its plans to first rehabilitate the displaced even before starting on their greenfield projects at Kalinga Nagar in Orissa and Tontoposhi in Jharkhand.

Under the “Tata Parivar” scheme, the displaced would first be shifted to a residential colony with assured electricity, water, sewerage and other modern amenities. Arrangements will be made for health and education services and training will be imparted to each according to his needs.

Tata Steel’s head of corporate communication Sanjay Choudhary today told the media that the company also planned to take villagers from Jharkhand to Orissa on a conducted tour so that they could see what the company has already done for the displaced at Kalinga Nagar.

The company, he said, has already set up a separate department of relief & rehabilitation with Shyam Thangaraj as its head. It has also set up a training institute at Seraikela (Jharkhand) and an information centre is also being set up to provide answers to the villagers and the curious.

Tata Steel plans to set up a 10 million tonne greenfield steel plant at Kalinga Nagar and a 12 million tonne steel plant in Jharkhand.

The company, said Choudhary, is committed to ensure an enhanced quality of life for the displaced. That is why, he claimed, it has taken steps for relief and rehabilitation even before reaching an agreement on land prices.

The rehabilitation plan, he said, will also take care of people marginally or indirectly affected by the project, like those running roadside eateries.

An identification process will precede registration of the people, each of whom will receive an identity card. Independent social audits will maintain transparency and monitor steady growth of income of the displaced.

It will be a customised scheme, revealed Choudhary, that will take into account the expertise, temperament and aptitude of the people. While the elderly used to farming will be helped with advanced agricultural techniques, the younger people with suitable qualifications will be trained for technical work.

The Tata Parivar project is on the lines of a similar project unveiled at Kalinga Nagar, he said, but will be significantly different because of regional requirements, local traditions and customs as well as geographical conditions.

The objective of the company is to ensure participation of the displaced people in all phases of the project, starting from construction to operation, he asserted.

Urbanisation of the displaced, proper attention to environmental considerations under which there will be a fair distance between the plant and the township and a customised plan for women are other features of the Tata Parivar project, he said.

Asserting that Tata Steel and “trust” are synonymous, Choudhary invited doubting Thomases to visit Kalinga Nagar and get a first hand account of the project.

A number of families at Kalinga Nagar, he claimed, have already been shifted to their new homes in the proposed township. A dedicated team of experts is already at work at Kalinga Nagar, he claimed, to make lives of the displaced comfortable.

The information centre at Seraikela, he added, will impart details of the rehab plan, along with township design.

Top

Tribal confined for 8 years after acquittal

The Telegraph - Calcutta : Frontpage

Court glare on justice delayed

Cuttack, May 7: In a rare summon to a civil court official, Orissa High Court today asked the registrar of a civil court in Phulbani to explain the circumstances under which Pratap Naik was detained in jail for over 8 years even after being acquitted in a murder case.

The two-judge bench of Chief Justice A.K. Ganguly and Justice Indrajit Mohanty issued the direction to the registrar of the court of the civil judge in Phulbani for a personal appearance on May 9 and also apprise the court in detail the action being taken against the person for whom the tribal youth was detained in the jail.

The bench issued the summon after expressing anguish over the lack of clarity of the affidavit submitted by the government and the failure of the state counsel to clarify its contents on the contents.

This is the second time the high court has come out with an order seeking details on the illegal detention while adjudicating on a PIL seeking compensation of Rs 10 lakh for it. Advocate Prabir Kumar Das, a human rights activist, had filed the PIL.

Earlier last week, the court had asked the state government to file an affidavit giving details on the illegal detention, along with a report on the action taken.

The government had subsequently submitted an affidavit attributing it to the negligence of a clerk at the court of the sessions judge in Phulbani. The clerk had been punished by way of departmental proceedings, the affidavit had stated. On perusal of the affidavit, the two-judge bench of Chief Justice A.K. Ganguly and Justice Indrajit Mohanty had sought queries from the state counsel giving indications that it was “confusing” and “irreconcilable” in some aspects.

The victim of the illegal detention, a resident of Ghimuhani village under Puruna Katak police station in Boudh district, was a minor, aged 14, when he was first sent to jail in a murder case by the Phulbani district and sessions judge court. He was acquitted by the high court in October 1994, but was released from jail only on January 22, 2003.

Das, in his petition, had alleged that the victim’s mental health had deteriorated due to the long confinement and he reportedly had to undergo psychiatric treatment.

"These conservation efforts are an example of what I think the President should do: John Edwards

DFA-Link: Edwards Response

"These conservation efforts are an example of what I think the President should do, which is to ask Americans to be patriotic about something other than war." - John Edwards http://johnedwards.com.

Saturday, May 05, 2007

Taking Dhaka did not figure in Manekshaw’s plans: General Jacob


Online edition of India's National Newspaper


Taking Dhaka did not figure in Manekshaw’s plans: General Jacob

In CNBC’s ‘India Tonight’ programme broadcast on April 30, Karan Thapar presented an interview with Lieutenant-General J.F.R. Jacob, who was Chief of Staff of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command during the Bangladesh campaign of 1971, and who was after his retirement Governor of Goa and Governor of Punjab, in the context of the Government’s decision to give Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw back pay for the period since his retirement from service over 36 years ago. There is a particular focus here on his role, as well as General Jacob’s role, in the Bangladesh campaign. This is an edited but substantially intact version of the transcript provided by CNBC:



Karan Thapar: Recently the Government gave Field Marshal Manekshaw a cheque for Rs. 1.6 crore in lieu of the salary he should have received as Field Marshal but didn’t get over the last 36 years. You have worked very closely with him. In 1971 when he was made Field Marshal, was he treated fairly or shabbily?

General Jacob: I think the Government was less than generous. He went out on a pension of Rs. 1,300 — that was Rs. 100 more than [that of] the Chief [of the Army Staff]. And no perks whatsoever, no car, nothing.

Karan: You met him a few days after his retirement. You called on him at the MES Inspection Bungalow. How did you find him?

Gen. Jacob: I found him sitting there dejected and looking very lonely. I asked him what the problem was, and he told me he had just returned after meeting Mrs. Gandhi and that he had asked to be made Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, which she declined. Instead she offered him the high commissionership in one of the Commonwealth countries, and he was very upset.

Karan: He was upset at being refused the Deputy Chairmanship. Did he explain why he wanted the Deputy Chairmanship?

Gen. Jacob: No, he didn’t explain it. But I pre-assume that he thought he would be able to do it. It’s an important job.

Karan: And it was the job he had set his heart on.

Gen. Jacob: Yes.

Karan: In fact, when Manekshaw visited Calcutta after retirement — by then you were the Army Commander in Calcutta — he didn’t even have a car and you put one at his disposal. But Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister, ticked you off for that.

Gen. Jacob: Yes, he did. He said, why [are] you giving him a car he is not authorised [to use] as a Field Marshal? So I told him, look I am not giving him a car because he is Field Marshal; this is a courtesy I extend to all ex-Army Commanders of the Eastern Command.

Karan: But the Defence Minister of the day didn’t like the idea?

Gen. Jacob: No.

Karan: Your association with Manekshaw goes back to 1950 when he was a Brigadier and DMO [Director of Military Operations] and you were a Major attached to General Staff in Delhi. He used to consult you a lot in those days, didn’t he?

Gen. Jacob: Yes, I used to go fairly often to his house. He was generous and hospitable to me and he used to discuss matters with me. You see, Sam unfortunately had a very short experience of war. He was wounded in the early stages of war; unfortunately he was not able to command a battalion, so he used to call me in for discussions.

Karan: So in a sense he had a short experience of war and he never commanded a battalion in his entire career.

Gen. Jacob: That’s correct.

Karan: Which meant those were little bits of disadvantages for him as a DMO. In contrast, you had done full five years in the Second World War, he needed your advice.

Gen. Jacob: Well, I don’t know [if] he needed [it] or not, but he used to ask for it.

Karan: In an interview in 1999, Manekshaw told me that he won a Military Cross almost at the beginning of the Second World War; a certain General Cowan took the unusual step of pinning the medal on him on the battlefield itself.

Gen. Jacob: Well, I don’t know about that: no one wears medals at war. But Sam deserved it: he was courageous and got an active gallantry [award]. But the question of anyone pinning on a medal… no one wears medals in war. I think it is Sam’s over-exuberance.

Karan: That’s a bit of an exaggeration.

Gen. Jacob: Well, call that…

Karan: You next served with Manekshaw in 1961. He was at that time the Commandant of the Staff College at Wellington and you were a member of the teaching staff. At the time Manekshaw was accused of anti-national activities and a court of inquiry was appointed to investigate the matter. And you were asked to give evidence. Is that right?

Gen. Jacob: That’s correct, I was rung up by General Kaul, offered anything if I gave evidence. I refused to give evidence. It’s not my wont and my character to give evidence against my boss. I refused.

Karan: But were you, in refusing to give evidence, protecting Manekshaw?

Gen. Jacob: I consider that is not done for me to give evidence against my boss. Had I done so, it would have caused difficulties for Manekshaw.

Karan: Had you given evidence, you could have caused difficulties for Manekshaw?

Gen. Jacob: I said it could have caused.

Karan: In other words, you are saying had you given evidence, had you spoken about things you knew of — instead of being exonerated as Manekshaw was, he could have been found guilty?

Gen. Jacob: I don’t think so. All I can say is, he might have created some problem.

Karan: At the time, if I recall correctly, the speculation was that Manekshaw had the habit of talking loosely. People say that he would go around referring to Indians dismissively as natives and that in public frequently, sitting at Wellington Club, he would criticise politicians like V.K. Krishna Menon, or General Kaul. If I recall correctly, you were honorary secretary of the Wellington Club. Was there some credibility to these stories?

Gen. Jacob: I can’t comment on that.

Karan: You can’t comment?

Gen. Jacob: No.

Karan: But you won’t deny them either.

Gen. Jacob: I won’t comment.

Karan: That’s very significant. You won’t comment, but you won’t deny them.

Let’s come to the 1971 war, for which Manekshaw is best known. At that time you were Chief of Staff, Eastern Command. It is widely believed that Manekshaw stood up to pressure from politicians and as a result military action was delayed from April 1971 to December. But that’s not the real truth, is it?

Gen. Jacob: Well, put [it] this way, he did ring me three times in early April to move to Bangladesh. I refused, I gave him reasons.

Karan: He rang you three times wanting the Army to move to Bangladesh?

Gen. Jacob: I gave him reasons why we couldn’t move.

Karan: I will soon ask you what your reasons were, but he wasn’t happy with your refusal?

Gen. Jacob: No.

Karan: He got irritated?

Gen. Jacob: Yes.

Karan: Now, you refused to move in. What exactly were the reasons you gave Manekshaw?

Gen. Jacob: I told him, look, we are mountain divisions. We don’t have a single bridge. There are large numbers of rivers between us to cross. We don’t have transport. The monsoon is about to break. And international penal [action] will not let you move. So these are the reasons we cannot move. I told him: [I’m] afraid it’s not possible at this stage.

Karan: Two things: first of all, the reasons you had — and obviously they were good reasons — for not moving in April were reasons he had never thought of or appreciated as the Army chief.

Gen. Jacob: I can’t comment on what he thought.

Karan: But clearly that follows that he was pushing you to move in, he rung you three times, were irritated by your refusal.

Gen. Jacob: But his people in Delhi pushed him.

Karan: Secondly, you also pointed out to him that if the Army moved in April, it would have been disastrous?

Gen. Jacob: Yes, it would have been, because we [would have] got bogged down.

Karan: So the truth is, people say Manekshaw stood up to political pressure and delayed military action from April to December. The full truth is that he did this because the Eastern Command stood up to him on three separate occasions, otherwise he might have agreed to the pressure he was under.

Gen. Jacob: Yes, maybe after he got our advice he went to the Cabinet and told them ‘No.’

Karan: Let’s now come to the war plan under which India fought the war. As Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, you sent your version of the plan to Delhi in May. What was the strategy that plan was based upon?

Gen. Jacob: We assessed that to win a war we had to take Dhaka. Dhaka was the geo-strategic heart of East Pakistan. No campaign would have been complete without it.

Karan: So the core of your war plan was the taking of Dhaka?

Gen. Jacob: Yes.

Karan: In August, Manekshaw came to Calcutta where the Eastern Command has its headquarters, where you were Chief of Staff. He came with [his] own war plan. How different was that to yours?

Gen. Jacob: It was very, very different. The orders that come with him, which he read out with his DMO, K.K. Singh, were the following:

You will take Khulna and Chittagong — these are the entry points — and territory. Those were the orders given.

Karan: And no mention of Dhaka whatsoever.

Gen. Jacob: None whatsoever

Karan: So Dhaka didn’t feature in Manekshaw’s war plan at all?

Gen. Jacob: At all.

Karan: I gathered [that] at that meeting in Calcutta there was a sort of acrimonious exchange of opinions. You fairly forcefully pointed out to Manekshaw that not taking Dhaka, not focussing on Dhaka, was a serious mistake. How did he react to your views?

Gen. Jacob: He was very upset. He said, don’t you see sweetie — that term he uses when he doesn’t like something you say. He said, don’t you see if we take Khulna and Chittagong the war will be over? I said I didn’t see how that could happen.

Karan: At that point he turned to General Aurora, who was there and who was your boss and army commander. And what did he say to General Aurora?

Jacob: Don’t you agree? Yes sir, I entirely agree, said General Aurora.

Karan: At that moment of time, you were in a minority — General Manekshaw, General Aurora and DMO K.K. Singh were all in favour of the war plan which Manekshaw had brought, which concentrated on Khulna and Chittagong and completely ignored Dhaka. You were a lone voice demanding that the war plan should concentrate on Dhaka instead.

Gen. Jacob: Yes, Manekshaw has briefed the government accordingly and these are orders, which have been approved.

Karan: So the nub of this is that ultimately when India went to war in December, it went to war with a war plan which completely ignored Dhaka?

Gen. Jacob: The war plan that was given to us in writing was [one that concentrated on] Khulna and Chittagong.

Karan: In fact, Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, the [Air Force] chief of the time, writes in his book My Years With the IAF, that the Indian Army didn’t expect that Pakistani forces in East Pakistan would collapse and that Dhaka would fall. As Air Chief Marshal Lal writes: “The possibility that Pakistani forces in West Pakistan would collapse altogether as they did and that Dhaka would fall... was not considered something that was likely to happen.”

Gen. Jacob: That’s correct. That was the recommendation given to the Government by Manekshaw.

Karan: So General Manekshaw did not expect that East Pakistan would collapse and Dhaka would fall.

Gen. Jacob: Correct

Karan: Air Chief Marshal P.C Lal has also contradicted something else that the Field Marshal has repeatedly said of himself. Manekshaw always claimed that he ran the war single-handedly — clearly suggesting that the Navy and the Air Force took orders from him. Air Chief Marshal Lal writes: “The three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, were left to plan their activities as they thought best.” Whose version is right: Manekshaw’s or Lal’s?

Gen. Jacob: Difficult. Lal is right.

Karan: Lal is right? You’re absolutely sure of that?

Gen. Jacob: Yes, sure.

Karan: There were also moments when Manekshaw’s behaviour upset and offended senior commanders. For instance, there is what happened on September 1971, when he flew to Calcutta with D.P Dhar. In front of him Dhar proceeded to scold senior generals... This was not only indiscreet and improper but could have affected camaraderie. They took that very badly.

Gen. Jacob: A meeting was there with the Army Commander, the Core Commander, the Divisional Commander, and Manekshaw started berating all of us.

Karan: And this had a bad effect on the Generals?

Gen. Jacob: It was resented deeply…

Karan: Therefore, at this critical moment of time, just two months before war began, this was very bad behaviour on the part of the Army chief?

Gen. Jacob: All I say is, people were surprised that Mr. D.P. Dhar, who is a politician and who was sitting close to the Prime Minister, was listening to it.

Karan: And the Army chief should not have scolded his senior Generals, whose services he critically required at that time, in this way?

Gen. Jacob: Well, I would have not done it.

Karan: Let’s jump to the weeks immediately before the military action in December. I’m talking about November. Manekshaw refused to give you troops to tackle Dhaka because he refused to make Dhaka a part of the war plan. You moved three brigades from the Chinese border for this purpose. What did he say when he found out?

Gen. Jacob: He was furious. And you see…I told…Gill who was the DMO…it was done between us… and [he] agreed with me to take Dhaka. Manekshaw was not informed of the move of these brigades and he was absolutely furious with Gill. He told him that he would… and that the brigades would move back at once.

Karan: But the brigades didn’t move back.

Gen. Jacob: I spoke to Gill and we had a long chat and I said I cannot move these brigades back.

Karan: So the brigades stayed where they were regardless of the fact that the Army chief was furious and wanted them to return.

Gen. Jacob: Gill did that…but…Gill made me promise since he was shouted at… I would not commit them inside Bangladesh without reference to them.

Karan: So you had access to them…should you need them…but you gave a commitment not to use them without further permission.

Gen. Jacob: I expected that I would be given permission once the war started… but permission was denied for five days… I requested every day for their deployment but they were not cleared to move in by Manekshaw until December 8.

Karan: So even when you needed these brigades he denied you permission for five full days. Had you got that permission five days earlier, could you have taken Dhaka five days earlier?

Gen. Jacob: We would not have taken Dhaka, but would have surely speeded up the fall of Dhaka.

Karan: So you could have speeded up the fall of Dhaka. You could have speeded up the war. But Gen. Manekshaw’s refusal to let you use these three brigades held things up.

Gen. Jacob: They did.

Karan: One other thing. Am I right in believing that when war began by December 2-3-4, the plan was to go for Khulna and Chittagong, but you ignored it and instead you went straight to Dhaka, which you always believed was the right thing to do?

Gen. Jacob: That’s correct.

Karan: Let’s jump the story to December 13. At that point in time, the Indian Army had bypassed towns like Rangpur, Dinajpur and Sylhet and had reached the gates of Dhaka. Which meant that you were virtually at the doorstep of the capital, but you had no major towns under your control except for Jessore and Comilla which the Pakistanis had evacuated and you had occupied. Is that a correct assessment of the position?

Gen. Jacob: Yes.

Karan: At this point in time, [there] was a great fear that India might be forced to accept a ceasefire and that if that happened [would be left] without major towns under its control?

Gen. Jacob: The U.N. was in session

Karan: The U.N. was in session, and if that had happened without any major town under its control the ceasefire would be very disadvantageous to India

Gen. Jacob: Entirely.

Karan: General Manekshaw sent you an order, copied to the Corps Commanders, asking you to capture all the bypassed towns. How did you respond to that order?

Gen. Jacob: Except Dhaka. Dhaka was not mentioned.

Karan: So he wanted all the towns that had been bypassed to be captured, but once again ignored Dhaka?

Gen. Jacob: No mention was made whatsoever. You can’t capture a town, it takes a long time… See what happened in Faluja. It takes time and it’s very heavy in casualties.

Karan: So you therefore ignored his orders?

Gen. Jacob: Well, there is an example in history. Horatio Nelson putting the telescope to his blind eye.

Karan: So you did the same thing.

Gen. Jacob: We did the same thing.

Karan: Now, in fact you went one step further… didn’t you? You also contacted a Corps Commander who had to copy to Signals what instructions you gave them?

Gen. Jacob: Ignore it.

Karan: You said, the Corps Commanders [may] ignore the Army chief’s signal. If you had agreed to what Manekshaw was asking and you had gone back to capture towns you had bypassed, there was the likelihood that you would have got bogged down.

Gen. Jacob: We would [have] completely [got] bogged down, we could not have captured the towns.

Karan: Secondly, … [had you] concentrated on the bypassed towns, you would have failed to take Dhaka.

Gen. Jacob: Absolutely right. [Had] we gone back, we couldn’t have taken Dhaka.

Karan: So had General Manekshaw’s signal of December 13 been accepted, that could have endangered India’s great victory?

Gen. Jacob: Well, I put it differently that it would have delayed the proceedings.

Karan: It would have delayed the proceedings… those proceedings, as you told me a moment ago, would anyway [have been] delayed because he denied you access to the three brigades. This order from Manekshaw was a bad order.

Let’s jump to December 15. General Niazi, the Pakistani Commander, sent a signal offering a ceasefire. More importantly, he had 30,000 soldiers under his command in Dhaka.

Gen. Jacob: Yes, about 30,000.

Karan: Whilst you only had 3,000 outside the city. So you were out-manned 10 to one.

Gen. Jacob: Yes.

Karan: In addition [to the fact that] the U.N. was in session, there was a Polish resolution in front of the Security Council calling for an Indian withdrawal. And the Russians had indicated that they were not going to use their veto in India’s favour again.

Gen. Jacob: And Poland was [part of the] Soviet bloc.

Karan: So at that point of time, on December 15, the circumstances both within East Pakistan and internationally made it seem as if a surrender was not the likely outcome.

Gen. Jacob: You see, Niazi had merely sent a signal to us, which was conveyed to the Americans, that there should be a ceasefire under the U.N., a withdrawal under the U.N., handover to the U.N., and no more crimes… That’s all.

Karan: And therefore if Niazi had used his 30,000 soldiers… he could have carried on fighting for another two to three weeks, giving the U.N. ample time to impose the ceasefire. And that would have been very disadvantageous because India had no other town under its control.

Gen. Jacob: That’s quite right.

Karan: So it’s a critical moment.

Gen. Jacob: Very critical.

Karan: Now on December 16 you arrived in Dhaka in response to Niazi’s offer of a ceasefire. Four hours later you had converted a ceasefire into an unconditional surrender. What did you do to achieve what sounds now like a miracle?

Gen. Jacob: Well… one thing that happened was, on the morning of December 16. Manekshaw phoned me and said go to Dhaka and get a surrender. I said we have sent you a surrender document, do I negotiate on those terms? He said just go, you know what to do. So I carried with me my draft what I sent to Delhi and I arrived in Dhaka with this draft with the staff officer. I was met at the Dhaka airport by the U.N.’s Mark Henry, Kelly and the others. And they said we are coming with you to arrange the ceasefire and withdraw the Pakistan Army and take over. I said, thank you very much, I don’t need your help. Then I proceeded to Niazi’s headquarters. The Pakistani Brigadier was with me, the Mukthi Bahini and the Pakistanis were fighting on the streets. Firing was going on. They wanted to kill this guy with me. With a lot of difficulty we reached the Pakistani headquarters and this thing was read out to Niazi — the surrender document. He said that you have only come here to discuss the ceasefire and withdrawal…Who said I am surrendering? So this argument went on. So it’s an unconditional surrender. I said it’s not an unconditional surrender, we have put the treaty with respect. We will evacuate all the civilians, etc., so it’s not an unconditional surrender.

Karan: Then what happened? How did you get him to agree to a surrender?

Gen. Jacob: Then I told him, General, I assure you if you surrender, accept these terms, we look after you, etc., and I will ensure that. The Government of India has given the word and will ensure your safety and that of your civilians.

Karan: Did you also say to him [that] if you don’t surrender, there will be no protection?

Gen. Jacob: I said that in a different way. I said if you don’t surrender, we can take no responsibility.

Karan: Then what happened?

Gen. Jacob: Then he kept [on talking] and then I said General, I cannot give you any better terms. I will give you 30 minutes. If you don’t comply I would have no option but to order resumption of hostilities.

Karan: During those 30 minutes were you panicking?

Gen. Jacob: I wasn’t panicking but I walked out and I said god, he has 30,000 troops we have 3,000... Suppose he says no, what do I do? And I had no answer.

Karan: Thirty minutes later you went back to the room, and what did he say?

Gen. Jacob: He kept quiet, I walked up to him. The document was on the table and I asked him: General, do you accept this document? I asked him three times but he didn’t answer. So I picked it up. I said, I take it as accepted.

Karan: At that point he also cried.

Gen. Jacob: He was in tears…

Karan: He was in tears… so in a sense you called his bluff… made him believe that you were in a more powerful position than you were…

Gen. Jacob: Yes, yes.

Karan: He fell for it and he failed to take advantage of the 30,000 soldiers he had.

Gen. Jacob: He was held to task by his own commission: why you didn’t do it? You know what he said, I was forced to do it because Gen. Jacob blackmailed me, he said he would hang them over the massacre.

Karan: Very quickly, you haven’t got the credit for the surrender that you organised almost single-handedly. Has history been unfair to you?

Gen. Jacob: No, I’m not commenting on that…I as a soldier did my duties, that’s not my concern.

Karan: One other question. Today you have cast Gen, Manekshaw, Field Marshal Manekshaw as he is, in a very different light to the way we’ve got used to thinking of him. You have suggested that the orders that he gave, particularly on changing the direction of military strategy, were wrong. You also suggested things about him when he was in his earlier post at Wellington that people will find hard to believe. You want to retract any other things you said?

Gen. Jacob: Listen, I have not suggested anything. You asked me questions and I have answered them to the best of my ability.

Karan: Do you stand by what you said?

Gen Jacob: I stand by what I said… all the things [relating to] the order for the operation are in Army Headquarters.

Karan: Everything you said is documented in Army Headquarters. Gen. Jacob, a pleasure talking to you on India Tonight.

Friday, May 04, 2007

Beyond Nandigram: Industrialization in WEST Bengal

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National Hwy 231 Vijawada - Ranchi

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Wednesday, May 02, 2007

PMO approves Vijaywada-Ranchi Highway - Tathya.in

Tathya.in
PMO approves Vijaywada-Ranchi Highway

New Delhi:05/December/2006
In 60s, the legendary Biju Patnaik had created sort of history by setting up the Express Highway in Orissa.

Apparently following his father’s foot steps, Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik, has succeeded in bringing a National Highway for Orissa.

This time, the junior Patnaik’s road is longer one, spanning from Motu in Malkangiri to Rairangpur in Mayurbhanj.

The original proposal for the much-awaited Vijaywada-Ranchi (VR) Road, mooted by Union Home Minister , got the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in principle approval, disclosed an official here on December 5.

Of the 2000 km highway major slice of the road of 1219 km lies in Orissa.

With this approval Orissa emerges as the biggest beneficiary.

The meeting chaired by T K A Nair, Principal Secretary in PMO, was attended by Union Rural Development Secretary Subas Pani, Union Road Transport & Highways Secretary Vijaya singh, chairman NHAI and others.

The VR Road, referred as the South-North corridor will be spread over 12 tribal dominated districts of Orissa, sources said.

Sources said the idea of having a Expressway in tribal dominated districts came in the wake of the left wing extremists activities in some parts of the state.

Chief Minister Mr.Patnaik feels that once the road communications in tribal districts are established, the government can easily tackle the LWEs problems.

Of the total 2000 km length of the VR Road, the Orisa will get 1219 km road.

The districts to be covered under this road are: Malkangiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati, Ganjam, Kandhmal, Boudh, Deogarh, Sambalpur, Angul, Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj.

Sources said the PMO approved this road after the Central Rural Development ministry agreed to fund its share for developing the road.

Union RD Secretary Subas Pani who till December was the Chief Secretary of Orissa, sources said lobbied for Naveen’s Road.

Dr. Pani was, in fact, instrumental in Naveen’s Government as the CS, to shout for the VR Road.

Naveen in the past meetings, either with the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh or with the Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil or while addressing the Internal Security Council conference, had raised the VR Road issue.

According to the initial estimate, while the RD ministry would provide Rs 186 crore, World Bank had agreed to give Rs 253 crore.

Rest of the money would come from: Rs 227 crore by the National Highway Authority of India( NHAI)and Rs 216 crore from the KBK Plan.

At least Rs 110 crore from the State Plan of the Orissa Government will be provided, said Nalini Kanta Pradhan, Engineer-in-Chief of the Works department.

Mr.Pradhan said Orissa has already started the process of availing funding from the Inter State connectivity Fund.

The multiple funding is being arranged keeping in view the magnitude of the project.

All the three states like Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand will be funding their share in this ambitious project, said sources.

The VR project will also open up gainful economic opportunities for large number of poor tribal communities, said an official.

Tuesday, May 01, 2007

Banks to follow new guidelines on education loan? - outlookindia.com | wired

outlookindia.com | wired: "EDUCATION PRINT EMAIL
Banks to follow new guidelines on education loan?

TIRUNELVELI,MAY1 (PTI)

Banks have proposed to follow certain new guidelines to make education loans more secure following reports that recovery of education loans was becoming tougher,and recovery rate was falling, according to official sources.

The sources said certificates of those availing the loans would carry 'Education Loan Availed' stamp.

The respective Universities would be asked to monitor as to where they (students who availed the loan) had got their placement. There was a plan to establish Education Loan Finance corporation to provide insurance cover for the education loan.

However,it was not know when the new guidelines would come into effect,Deputy General Manager of State Bank of India N.Sadhasivam told reporters here last night.

He said the Madurai zone planned to disburse more than Rs.100 crore as education loan this year.He said the rate of unrecovered loan was 40 per cent.

The education loan was given from 2001.Those who had availed the loan should have started repaying the loan from 2005,that is after the period of concession for repayment was over.But the NPA was 40 per cent in Education loan.'This is worrying the banks,' he added.

So the Government was thinking of issuing new guidelines and following new procedure for Education loans,the sources said."

Demolish drive at Amartya aide door - The Telegraph - Calcutta : Nation

The Telegraph - Calcutta : Nation

New Delhi, April 30: The hut of Jean Dreze, Amartya Sen’s co-author who used to advise Sonia Gandhi on development issues, has come in the line of the Delhi demolition drive.

Dreze’s dwelling is among the 10,000 shortlisted for demolition in a slum near Delhi University, on the northern fringes of the capital.

Citing a court order, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has pasted eviction notices on the doors of the huts at Sanjay Basti, named, ironically, after the late Nehru-Gandhi blamed for the infamous drive against slums during Emergency.

“As per the directive of Delhi High Court… this land has to be vacated by 27/04/07. If not vacated by the said date, the houses will be demolished on 4/5/2007,” the MCD notice said.

Dreze, recognised as the spearhead of the grassroots movement that resulted in the Right to Information Act, has now turned to that law to find out if the government has a fall-back plan for the homeless.

The visiting professor at Allahabad’s G.B. Pant Social Science Institute could not be reached for comment, but his wife Bela Bhatia confirmed they had put in an application under the RTI Act.

Bhatia, a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, said they had asked for a copy of a joint survey by the MCD and the Central Public Works Department to identify “illegal bastis” and whether there was a relocation plan under the capital’s new urban development blueprint.

“There is no word so far,” she said.

Dreze or John bhai — as the Basti that has been his home for several years knows him — and Bela live in a one-room hut with an asbestos roof and use the community toilet and bath. The hut does have electricity and water connection though.

Originally meant to house Type I quarters for Class IV government employees, this little hub of concrete was overtaken by the slums that proliferated around it and has serviced political parties lusting after “vote banks”. Some of these flats still exist, though dilpaidated, and are occupied by goverment employees.

Dreze is famous as the co-author of at least half-a-dozen books on the politics of hunger, development and social opportunity with Nobel-winner Sen.

But turned out in khadi kurta-pyjama and usually seen riding a bike, he fits the mould of activist better than academic. The Belgian-origin Dreze led the right to food and the right to information campaigns with Aruna Roy, the Magsaysay award winner from Rajasthan.

Brought into the National Advisory Council by Sonia, the duo pushed the national rural employment guarantee and information laws — but Dreze resigned soon after the jobs bill was introduced in Parliament because he thought it diluted the provisions in the first draft. Aruna also put in her papers later.

A student of mathematical economics at the Essex University and a Ph.D in economics from the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, Dreze has taught at the London School of Economics and the Delhi School of Economics. He is now an Indian citizen.

Barring Dreze and a few political activists, most residents of the Basti had no clue about the high court’s directive and thought the demolition was meant to pave the way for a “big mall” for the rich.

“We don’t know how this happened. We have lived here since 1978 and now where can we go?” said Naresh, a shop hand.